Announcement/Notes by Editors,
January, 1932
ANNOUNCEMENT
The REVIEW takes pleasure in announcing the election of the following
members of the Third Year class, to the Editorial Board: Samuel A. Blank,
Robert Gibbon, I. Edward Harburg, Samuel L. Sperling and Sidney S. Stark;
to the Business Board: Richard H. Hollenberg. The REVIEW also announces
the resignation of Samuel A. Blank and I. Edward Harburg from the Business
Board.
NOTES
POWER OF BANKRUPTCY COURT TO ENJOIN LIEN ENFORCEMENT-After
a period of abnormal inflation during which unprecedented sums were invested
in loans secured by real estate mortgages, there has come a natural period of
readjustment with a cataclysmic decline in realty values, bringing in its wake
countless bankruptcies of mortgagors and imperiling the financial position of the
mortgage creditors. These factors have elevated the problem of lien enforce-
ment to a place of importance, both to the mortgage lienholder and the general
creditors of the bankrupt, unthought of two or three decades ago. The mort-
gage creditors are primarily concerned with a complete realization upon their
liens by an unrestrained and undelayed foreclosure proceeding, usually in a
state court; while the general creditors, through the medium of the trustee in
bankruptcy, are naturally opposed to such an unrestricted form of action, in
the hope of securing a more equitable and beneficial administration of the bank-
rupt's estate in the bankruptcy court itself. This conflict of interests, then, con-
fronts the bankruptcy tribunal in every case involving the enforcement of liens,
whether the enforcement is instituted after bankruptcy, or is pending at the time
of bankruptcy.
Confronted with this perplexing impasse, the Supreme Court of the United
States, speaking through Associate Justice Roberts in Isaacs, Trustee v. Hobbs
Tie & Timber Co.' recently injected its solution of several troublesome issues.2
First, it unequivocally established the proposition that after the mortgagor of
realty has been declared a bankrupt, his title and right to possession vest in the
trustee in bankruptcy, so that a mortgagee cannot thereafter commence fore-
closure proceedings in another court "save by consent of the bankruptcy court." 8
Second, that the action of the trustee in removing the cause to the federal court
could not thereby divest the bankruptcy tribunal of its jurisdiction.4 Third, that
the fact of the land in question being located outside the territorial jurisdiction
over which the bankruptcy court sits could not prevent the trustee from either
obtaining an injunction by means of ancillary proceedings in the District Court
1282 U. S. 734, 51 Sup. Ct. 270 (1931). Cf. In re Schulte-United, Inc., 49 F. (2d)
264 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931) ; Stratton v. New, Trustee, 283 U. S. 318, 51 Sup. Ct. 465 ('931).
The pertinent facts of that case were as follows: After the mortgagor had been ad-
judicated a bankrupt by the bankruptcy court in Texas, the mortgagee instituted a fore-
closure suit in the state court of Arkansas, where the land is located. The trustee in bank-
ruptcy thereupon had the suit removed from the state to the federal court of Arkansas,
where the prior adjudication of bankruptcy was upheld as a valid defense to the fore-
closure proceedings.
']bid. at 738, 51 Sup. Ct. at 271, "Such injunctions (against foreclosing mortgagees)
are granted solely for the reason that the court in which foreclosure proceedings are insti-
tutted is without jurisdiction, after adjudicated of bankruptcy, to deal with the land
or liens upon it save by consent of the bankruptcy court." See AmzR. BANMR. REv. (April,
1931) p. 267.
'Ibid. 739, 51 Sup. Ct. at 271.
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for the district in which the land is located, or as here, pleading the bankruptcy
adjudication as a defense in the foreclosure suit itself."
It is needless to consider the remedy to be used in enforcing any lien,
whether on realty or personalty, unless that incumbrance is a valid one, i. e., one
not dissolved by the intervention of bankruptcy proceedings,' as would be a
preference created by contract or a lien obtained by legal proceedings within
four months of bankruptcy.' There is no doubt that once validly created, such
a lien remains unaffected by bankruptcy proceedings, for the trustee in bank-
ruptcy takes title to the bankrupt's property subject to any valid, pre-existing
liens." However, the question of the creation of liens is an entirely distinct one
from that of enforcing them after their creation. The court in Isaacs V. Hobbs,
etc., makes this distinction quite apparent by refusing to permit a foreclosure
after bankruptcy, without leave of the bankruptcy court, even though the mort-
gage lien is an unassailable one, created more than four months prior to bank-
ruptcy.
Generally speaking, the theory underlying that result is that upon the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy, the bankruptcy forum is clothed with exclusive
jurisdiction over the res, together with custody of the bankrupt's property, so
that proceedings begun subsequently in another court, state or federal, may be
enjoined as an unwarranted interference with the power vested in the bank-
ruptcy court.5 In short, "when a court of competent jurisdiction has, by
appropriate proceedings, taken property ilito its possession through its officers,
the property is thereby removed from the jurisdiction of all other courts. The
latter courts, though of concurrent jurisdiction, are without power to render
any judgment which invades or disturbs the possession of the property while it
is in the custody of the court which has seized it." 10 Or as it was aptly phrased
by Chief Justice Fuller in Mueller v. Nugent,"
5 Ibid.
§ 67 (e) and (f) of Bankruptcy Act, I898, 30 STAT. 564; § 107, II U. S. C. 137.
'Ibid.; Keystone Brewing Co. v. Schermer, 241 Pa. 361, 88 Atl. 657 (913) ; In re East-
ern Comm. and Importing Co., i29 Fed. 847 (D. C. Mass. I9O4). Cf. In re Grissler, 136
Fed. 754 (C. C. A. 2d, i9o5), where work is begun before bankruptcy, and a mechanic's lien
filed within the time fixed by local statute, even though within four months of bankruptcy,
it is a valid lien, on the ground that it is not a "lien obtained by legal proceedings." Some
cases have even gone so far as to uphold as valid such a statutory lien not perfected until
after adjudication of bankruptcy. Hastings v. Thompson, 47 Pa. Super. 424 (I91i).
§ 7o (a) Bankruptcy Act, 1898, 30 Stat. 565; § HO, i U. S. C. =. In this con-
nection, it was at first argued that § 47 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended by the Act of
1910 (§ 47 (a) of Bankruptcy Act, 1898, 30 STAT. 557) as amended by Act of June 25,
I9IO, § 8, 36 STAT. 840; § 75, i1 U. S. C. ISo (". . and such trustees, as to all property
in the custody or coming into the custody of the bankruptcy court, shall be deemed vested
with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor holding a lien by legal or equitable
proceedings thereon; and also, as to all property not in the custody of the bankruptcy court,
shall be deemed vested with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a judgment creditor
holding an execution duly returned unsatisfied") had a different effect. The purpose of
this amendment was to protect the estate against unrecorded chattel mortgages or condi-
tional sales contracts by giving the trustee a lien. It gave the trustee in bankruptcy greater
rights than the bankrupt himself and wider powers than the trustee originally had prior to
the amendment, with respect to bringing property alleged to be part of the bankrupt's estate
within the possession of the bankruptcy court. But, judicial interpretation (In re Smith-
Flynn Commission Co., 292 Fed. 46.5, at 473 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923)) has firmly settled that
§ 47 (a) must be considered in conjunction with § 70 (a) of the bankruptcy Act (supra,
note 8), under which the trustee takes subject to all valid equitable liens good against the
bankrupt. Moreover, the amendment of i9io has been construed to vest the trustee with
the status of a lien creditor from the moment when the petition in bankruptcy is filed, en-
abling liens to be adjudged valid or invalid as of that date, rather than from the date of
adjudication. (Everett v. Judson, 228 U. S. 474, 33 Sup. Ct. 568 (1913)).
BLAcK, BANKRUPTCY (4th ed. 1926) 1192; COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY (Ixth ed. 1917) 293.10FosTrR, FEDERAL PRACTICE (5th ed. 1913) 152.
"184 U. S. I, 22 Sup. Ct. 269 (lgOI).
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.. . the filing of the petition is a caveat to all the world, and in effect an
attachment and injunction . . . ; and on adjudication, title to the bankrupt's
property became vested in the trustee, § 70, with actual or constructive
possession, and placed in the custody of the bankruptcy court."
This was reiterated in Acme Harvester Co. v. Beekvan Lumber Co.,12 Justice
Day adding that
"the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is so far in rem that the
estate is regarded as in custodia legis from the filing of the petition."
As early as i9oo, a bankruptcy court in In re San Gabriel Sanatorium Co.," con-
fronted with a set of facts almost identical to that of Isaacs v. Hobbs, etc.,
restrained a foreclosure on realty in a state court started after bankruptcy of the
mortgagor. Subsequent decisions, possibly fearing to rely solely on prior juris-
diction as a logical reason for staying enforcement proceedings in another court,
have expressed practical reasons for such a course. Thus, in In re Pittlekow 11
where after bankruptcy, mortgage creditors holding thirty-nine mortgages on
realty of the bankrupt threatened immediate foreclosure, they were enjoined, to
save the expense and consquent diminution of the estate incident to separate fore-
closures. Similarly in In re Zehner '1 the court neither permitted a foreclosure
in the state court where it was probable that a surplus over the mortgage lien
might accrue to the benefit of the general creditors, nor did it find that the bank-
ruptcy court abused its discretion by granting an injunction, even though it was
alleged that the bankrupt's equity in the mortgaged premises was of no value,
where the record did not conclusively show that fact." Conversely, a few recent
decisions have declared that where the mortgage creditor's claims exceed the
value of the mortgaged premises, the bankruptcy forum will not take the case
from the state court, for the quite evident reason that there is no equity to be
safeguarded on behalf of the general creditors,1 7 and the trustee can sufficiently
protect the estate by intervening in the action in the state court to litigate any
'Acme Harvester Co. v. Beekman Lumber Co., 222 U. S. 3oo, at 306, 32 Sup. Ct. 98,
at 99 (i912), "the filing of the petition is an assertion of jurisdiction with a view to the
determination of the status of the bankrupt and a settlement and distribution of his estate.
. . . It is true that under § 7o (a) of the Act of 1898 the trustee of the estate, on his appoint-
ment and qualification, is vested by operation of the law with the title of the bankrupt as
of the date he was adjudicated a bankrupt; but there are many provisions of the law which
show its purpose to hold the property of the bankrupt intact from the time of the filing of
the petition, in order that it may be administered under the law if an adjudication in bank-
ruptcy shall follow the beginning of the proceedings." See also Matthews & Sons v. Webre
Co., 213 Fed. 396 (E. D. La. 1914).
a io-0 Fed. 310 (C. C. A. 9th, igoo), at 313: "It is true, the state court has exclusive
jurisdiction over proceedings to foreclose mortgages, but where, as in this case, the state
jurisdiction has been invoked after bankruptcy proceedings have been commenced, and where
the validity of a mortgage lien or some part of it is involved in the bankruptcy proceedings,
we think the bankruptcy court should retain its jurisdiction until such claims are fully deter-
mined and adjudicated . . ."; later reversed by iii Fed. 892 (go) after the decision
of Bardes v. Bank, 178 U. S. 524, 20 Sup. Ct. 1000 (1900) (infra note 42), not as to the
question of bankruptcy court's power to stay proceedings, but because of the interpretation
of 23 (b) of the Bankruptcy Act, ruling that in a case where the trustee in bankruptcy is
suing an adverse claimant to recover property alleged to be part of the bankrupt's estate,
the District Court of bankruptcy has no jurisdiction, without the consent of the proposed
defendant.
"In re Pittlekow, 92 Fed. 9oi (D. C. Wis. 1899).
293 Fed. 787 (E. D. La. 192). "But it seems to me, however, that in all cases
where it is probable a surplus will be realized over and above the liens and mortgages, or
even in doubtful cases, it would be better for all parties concerned that the property be sold
through the bankruptcy court." BLACK, BANKRVPTCY (4th ed. 1926) 1192.
Pugh v. Loisel, 229 Fed. 417 (C. C. A. 5th, 1915).
"In re Parrino, 5o F. (2d) 611 (E. D. N. Y. 193i); In re Schulte-United, Inc., 49
F. (2d) 264 (C. C. A. 2d, 2931).
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disputed questions.' But, even here, it is curious to note that the bankruptcy
court steadfastly emphasizes its power to enjoin, if it should deem it advisable
to do so.'"
Conceding that the court of bankruptcy has acquired complete jurisdiction
over the person and property of the bankrupt, can that court surrender its control
over the bankruptcy administration to some other tribunal? Isaacs v. Hobbs, etc.,
held that it could not,2 0 on the authority of United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. v. Bray,21 for even though the suit is begun in another court with the express
leave of the bankruptcy tribunal, as in the Bray case, the latter is "not at liberty
to surrender its exclusive control over matters of administration or to confide
them to another tribunal." A holding such as this, however, does not forbid the
court from granting its consent upon motion of the mortgagee to a foreclosure in
the state court, making the trustee a party thereto, 22 for by acceding to the request
for leave to foreclosure, the bankruptcy court is not relinquishing its entire juris-
diction over the proceedings, but only exercising its discretion in an approved
manner.
2 3
Where the state court or a federal court has first taken jurisdiction over the
enforcement of a valid lien, e. g., a mortgage executed more than four months
prior to bankruptcy, which foreclosure is pending at the time of bankruptcy, it is
uniformly held that the jurisdiction of that state or federal court ought not to
be divested, nor should the lienholder be stayed therein, provided that the state
court has acquired complete and exclusive control over, and possession of the
res.24 .Aside from its logicality, this stand is desirable in that the jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy court should not be artificially enlarged so as to constitute an
encroachment upon a state court's jurisdiction, especially where that would be
reading into a statute something not there either expressly or by implication. As
expressed by Foster:
"a court of the United States, through a spirit of judicial comity, will usually
refuse to interfere with property in the custody of the state court," just as
"lin re Porter, xog Fed. iii, at 112 (D. C. Ky. Igoi).
'Ibid. at 112: "It seems to the court, speaking generally, that it has jurisdiction
in bankruptcy cases of an application for an injunction against proceedings in a state court
where the assets of the bankrupt are concerned, and that it would have the right to enjoin,
in its discretion, on the facts stated in the petition here."
'Supra note 4.
21225 U. S. 205, 32 Sup. Ct. 62o (1912).
CO'Reilly v. Pietri, 135 La. i, 64 So. 92- (914), decides that, in a sense, trustee con-
sents to jurisdiction in state court by making himself a party to proceedings commenced
there at a date prior to bankruptcy. Cf. Pugh v. Loisel, 219 Fed. 417, at 424 (C. C. A. 5th,
1'In re Parrino, 5o F. (2d) at 613 (E. D. N. Y. 1931) ; In re Schulte-United, Inc., 49
F. (2d) 264 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931), which distinguishes itself from Isaacs v. Hobbs, supra note
4, on the ground that the mortgagee in its case proceeded to obtain the consent of the bank-
ruptcy court by satisfying it that no harm could befall the estate by a foreclosure in the
state court. See dictum in It re Zehner, 193 Fed. 787, at 788 (E. D. La. 1912).
,Stratton v. New, Trustee, 283 U. S. 318, 5, Sup. Ct. 465 (1931). Am. BANK. REV.
(May, 1931) at 306, ". • . the federal courts have with practical unanimity held that
where a judgment which constitutes a lien on the debtor's real estate is recovered more than
four months prior to the filing of the petition, the bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction
to enjoin the prosecution of the creditor's action, instituted prior to the filing of a petition
in bankruptcy, to bring about a judicial sale of the real estate"; In re Rohrer, 177 Fed. 381
(C. C. A. 6th, 19io); Clark v. Norwalk Steel Co., 188 Fed. 999 (N. D. Ohio I9os), allow-
ing another federal court to continue its jurisdiction, even though the receiver was appointed
and possession of the property assumed only one day before the petition in bankruptcy was
filed; In re McKane, 152 Fed. 733 (E. D. N. Y. 19o7) in re Gerdes, IO2 Fed. 31R (S. D.
Ohio i9oo); Metcalf v. Barker, 187 U. S. 165, 23 Sup. Ct. 67 (1902), a leading case;
Pickens v. Roy, I87 U. S. 177, 23 Sup. Ct. 78 (19o2). BLACK, BANKRUPTCY, (4th ed. 1926)
1192. Contra: In re Dana, 167 Fed. 529 (C. C. A. 8th, 19o9) ; In re Eppstein, I56 Fed. 42,
(C. C. A. 8th, 19o7). On the whole, Cf. Blair v. Brailey, 22_1 Fed. i (C. C. A. 5th, 1915).
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it "will not tolerate interference with property over which it has taken juris-
diction." 2
One court, in a significant dictumn has stated that
"the jurisdiction of the state court to sell property of the bankrupt, even
after adjudication, is concurrent with that of the federal court, and the latter
jurisdiction is only exclusive by reason of its custody of the res." 26
The leading case of Metcalf v. Barker 11 and subsequent holdings 28 have made
clear the difference between a suit brought in the state forum within four months
of bankruptcy to create a lien, which is denounced by § 67 (f) of the Bankruptcy
Act, and a suit and decree therein within the four months period to enforce a
valid, pre-existing lien, which is not affected by any provision of the bankruptcy
statute. In such event, just as the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court dates
from the filing of the petition,2 9 so that of the state court commences from the
moment of filing the bill for executory process in judgment executions, 0 or from
the moment the receiver is appointed and takes possession of the property in fore-
closure proceedings.," The jurisdiction so placed in the state tribunal persists,
even though the contention is advanced that the property in question is of greater
value than the amount of the creditor's lien, on the justifiable theory that any
excess obtained as a result of the sale by the sheriff will be part of the estate of
the bankrupt, and subject to the purview of the bankruptcy court.3 2 This position
seems logically consistent with the exclusive jurisdiction vested in the state court,
and any other conclusion can be substantiated only on practical grounds. 3  On
the contrary, where an additional stimulus is present in that the value of the mort-
gaged property is insufficient to pay the mortgage debt, 34 there is no more cause
FosTER, FEDERAL PRACTICE (5th ed. 1913) 152.
'In re Zehner, i93 Fed. 787 (E. D. La. 1912).
'Metcalf v Barker, 187 U. S. i65 (1902), at 174: "A judgment or decree in enforce-
ment of an otherwise valid pre-existing lien is not the judgment denounced by the statute,
which is plainly confined to judgments creating liens."
'In re Schwartz, 52 F. (2d) 9oo (W. D. Pa. 1931), which declares that in Pa. the
lien of a judgment on a bond accompanying a mortgage on realty relates back to the date
when the mortgage was recorded more than four months bifore bankruptcy, rather than
from the date of entry of the judgment, which was within four months of bankruptcy, so that
enforcement of that lien within four months of bankruptcy is only the enforcement of a
valid, prior lien, and is not affected by § 67 (f) ; Stratton v. New, Trustee, see mepra note
24; In re Rohrer, 177 Fed. 381 (C. C. A. 6th, igio); In re McKane, 152 Fed. 733 (E. D.
N. Y. 1907), at 734: ". . The judgment is merely a decree by a court having competent
jurisdiction directing the enforcement of a lien which cannot be affected or vacated by
bankruptcy proceedings"; Pickens v. Roy, 187 U. S. 177, 23 zup. Ct. 78 (902).
"Supra notes ii and 12.
'McLoughlin v. Knop, 214 Fed. 26o (D. C. La. 1913), at 262: "It is contended by the
trustee that the civil district court (court in which execution brought) -did not obtain juris-
diction over the property until the seizures were actually made. (Seizure made after bank-
ruptcy.) With this I cannot agree. In Freedman's Savings & Trust Co. v. Earle, iio U. S.
717, the Supreme Court said: 'The filing of the bill, in cases of equitable execution, is the
beginning of executing it."'
I Clark v. Norwalk Steel Co., i88 Fed. 999 (N. D. Ohio I9O8).
'Carter v. Peoples' Nat. Bk., io9 Ga. 573, 35 S. E. 6i (igoo). Contra: In re Booth,
96 Fed. g43 (D. C. Ga. 1899), at 944: ".. . the court (bankruptcy) has power to continue
the trustee in possession in a case like this, where it appears to be for the advantage of the
estate to have the mortgaged property brought into the bankruptcy court, and administered
with the balance of the estate for the best interests of all the creditors."
For example, the bankruptcy court might obtain a higher price by selling in one lot
a row of houses owned by the bankrupt mortgagor, than if the mortgagees foreclosed
separately in state courts.
"In re Holloway, 93 Fed. 638 (D. C. Ky. I899), at 640: "... where it is apparent
or extremely probable, that the mortgaged property will not be sufficient to pay the mort-
gage debt, it would be neither necessary nor judicious for this court to interfere with the
state court proceedings." The same court suggests, however, that if the transaction in the
state court were tainted with fraud, it could enjoin.
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for restraint by the bankruptcy court than in the foreclosure suit instituted after
bankruptcy.
Either because of the influence exerted by the line of decisions 35 behind
Isaacs v. Hobbs, etc., or because of an independent conviction in favor of the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court from the moment of the filing of the petition,
other bankruptcy courts have applied the doctrine of restraint as used in cases
of foreclosure started after bankruptcy, to somewhat analogous situations. For
example, it has been asserted that a chattel mortgagee may be prevented from
selling a mortgaged stock of merchandise after bankruptcy of the chattel mort-
gagor, even though the mortgage was validly executed more than four months
before bankruptcy.3 6 Similarly, a trustee's petition was upheld to enjoin a sale
of the bankrupt's assets under a landlord's warrant of distress instituted after
bankruptcy. 7 The latter holding is an easier one to justify than the former, for,
in contradistinction to the chattel mortgagee, the landlord has no valid contract
existing before bankruptcy bestowing on him the right to foreclose upon default
of the debtor, but instead, he simply resorts to an independent judicial process
after bankruptcy of the tenant. In a like vein, bankruptcy fora have forestalled
attempts to enforce mechanics' liens after bankruptcy,3 and have condemned a
sale of the bankrupt's property for taxes, hinting that the sale might have been
restrained. 39 As a group, these rulings are relatively acceptable as indicating a
common trend of legal thought in the direction of preserving free from usurpation
the orderly administration of the bankrupt's estate in the bankruptcy court.
A strict adherence to the "power to enjoin" maxim in the pledge situation,
however, is not as unimpeachable a stand. With the decision in Isaacs v. Hobbs,
etc., as the ratio decidevdi, and by an extension of the principle therein stated,
the court in In re Henry " reached the conclusion that a pledgee, whose contract
gave him power to sell upon non-payment by the pledgor, could be prohibited
from selling the pledged collateral after the pledgor's bankruptcy. The court
thus harked back to the somewhat comparable situation in In re Cobb,4' decided
back in 1899, to hand down a similar decision, although that ruling had been
'Supra notes II, 12 and 13.
'In re Ball, 118 Fed. 672 (D. C. Vt. i9o2), "A sale by her (the mortgagee) would
• . . confessedly waste the estate and wrong the general creditors. . . "; In re Brooks,
9i Fed. 5o8, at 5o9 (D. C. Vt. 1898), "After the filing of the petition, . . . the petitionee
could not lawfully proceed according to the provisions of the statute of the state, nor with-
out leave of the court having jurisdiction and control of the property." Cf. with dictun
by Knowlton, J. in Harvey v. Smith, 179 Mass. 592, 61 N. E. 217 (igoi), to the effect that
the mortgagee has a power of sale coupled with an interest which would not be disturbed
even by the mortgagor's bankruptcy.
it re Printograph Sales Co., 21o Fed. 567 (E. D. Pa. 19,4), "The right to distrain
for rent in arrears must be exercised prior to adjudication to be of avail." This suggests
that a distraint after the filing of the petition, but before adjudication, would be permitted.
In re Bishop, 153 Fed. 304 (D. C. S. Car. i9o7). Cf. It re West Side Paper Co., 162 Fed.
no (C. C. A. 3d, i9o8) ; ln re Robinson, 154 Fed. 343 (C. C. A. 7th, i9o7), which permit a
landlord to create a valid lien by distraint levied within four months of bankruptcy, on the
theory of "quasi-pledge", holding that such a lien is in no sense obtained by legal proceed-
ings within the prohibition of § 67 (f) of the Bankruptcy Act. Quaere, is not a levy of dis-
tress by a landlord a legal proceeding?
'In re Emslie, io2 Fed. 291 (C. C. A. 2d, igoo) ; It re Russell, ioi Fed. 248 (C. C. A.
-d, igoo).
'Dayton v. Stanard, 241 U. S. 588, 36 Sup. Ct. 695 (1916).
'05o F. (2d) 453 (E. D. Pa. 1931). The court deemed its problem conclusively settled
by Isaacs v. Hobbs: "It is admitted that the case of Isaacs, Trustee v. Hobbs, etc.. . .
rules that another court cannot decree the sale of assets in the possession and under the con-
trol of the bankruptcy court without the leave of the latter court." Accord: In the Matter
of Purkett-Douglas & Co. (S. D. Cal. 1931), Am. BANIUI REv. (April, 1931) -82. See
discussion of In re Henry in (i93I) So U. oF PA. L. REv. 123. Contra to In re Henry: In re
Mayer, 157 Fed. 836 (C. C. A. 2d, i9o7).
' re Cobb, 96 Fed. 821 (E. D. N. C. 1899).
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somewhat discredited.42 Text writers,43 on the other hand, have had no difficulty
in taking the opposite position, and would allow the pledgee free rein in disposing
of his collateral pursuant to the terms of his contract. Moreover, most courts, in
the absence of fraud and oppression,44 have seen fit not to deny the pledgee the
right of sale as given by the contract of pledge,4 5 even though it is alleged that
irretrievable loss will result to the unsecured creditors.46 _As in the foreclosure
of mortgages after bankruptcy, the bankruptcy courts, as a rule, will refuse to
clutter their administration proceedings with sales of pledged property worth less
than the amount of the liens thereon .4  But, a dictum in Griffith v. Smith 48
intimated that even the problematical probability of a surplus accruing to the
benefit of the general creditors would not warrant the issuance of an injunction
to delay the pledgee. Several tribunals, 9 dissatisfied with the pledgee's contrac-
tual right to sell after bankruptcy as a sole ground for refusing to enjoin, have
invoked, in addition, § 57 (h)5 0 of the Bankruptcy Act, as entitling the lienholder
to convert his securities into money "according to the terms of the agreement
pursuant to which such securities were delivered to such creditors." Even if such
"Bardes v. Bank, 178 U. S. 524, 20 Sup. Ct. iooo (igoo), supra, note 13. If In re Cobb
had arisen after Bardes v. Bank, an opposite result would probably have been arrived at,
since in both cases § 23 (b) would apply, and Bardes v. Bank had decided that the trustee
could not sue for recovery of property alleged to be part of the bankrupt's estate, i. e., an
independent suit apart from bankruptcy proceedings, in the District Court of bankruptcy,
unless the proposed defendant consented thereto.
' BLACK, BANKRUPTCY (4th ed. 1926) 1195: "But the case is different with a pledgee
holding property of the bankrupt under a valid contract of pledge to secure a genuine debt.
As the property is not in the custody or possession of the court of bankruptcy, it has no
jurisdiction over it further than to protect the interests of general creditors against any
fraudulent or oppressive conduct on the part of the pledgee or in respect to any surplus.
Hence, the pledgee, acting fairly, has the right to sell the property in accordance with the
terms of the contract and apply the proceeds in payment of his debt, accounting to the trus-
tee for any surplus, and he will not be enjoined from so doing"; REmINGTON, BANKRUPTCy
(3d ed. 1923) 703, § 2510.
"Mercer Nat. Bk. v. White's Exec., 236 Ky. 128, at 132, 32 S. W. (2d) 734, at 737
(I93O), "The pledgee has a special property in the thing pledged which entitles him to the
possession, to protect which he may maintain detinue, replevin, or trover, and the interest
of the pledgor is not subject to execution; and the bankruptcy court will not interfere with
a sale by the pledgee of the thing pledged, under the power of sale given by the terms of
his contract, when there is no claim that such power is exercised in a fraudulent or oppres-
sive manner"; Hiscock v. Varick Bank, 2o6 U. S. 28, 27 Sup. Ct. 681 (19o7) ; In re Browne,
1O4 Fed. 762 (E. D. Pa. igoo).
In re Peacock, 178 Fed. 851 (E. D. N. Car. igio) ; In re Mayer, 157 Fed. 836 (C. C.
A. 2d, I9O7), the facts of which are almost on all fours with those in In re Henry, supra
note 40; Jerome v. McCarter, 94 U. S. 734 (1876) ; at 740: "There are some bonds that
are still held in pledge; but the pledgees have a clear right to use them, either by sale or
by collection, until the full amount of the debts due from the mortgagors is satisfied." Cf.
Hiscock v. Varick Bank, supra note 44, where the case arose after a sale by the pledgee.
"In re Ironclad Mfg. Co., 192 Fed. 318 (C. C. A. 2d, 1912).
' Mercer Nat. Bk. v. White's Exr., 236 Ky. 328, 32 S. W. (2d) 734 (1930); It re
Peacock, 178 Fed. 851 (E. D. N. C. igio).
4 177 Cal. 481, 171 Pac. 92 (I918), at 483 and 93 respectively: "But if, overlooking
the defective form of the pleading, we take it as intended to aver that a substantial surplus
above plaintiff's claim might be realized if the sale were postponed, the allegation is still
insufficient. The plaintiff, as a pledgee, has a matured and present right to realize upon
his security. The pledgor is not justified in asking that the exercise of this right be de-
ferred indefinitely to await a purely problematical increase in the price which might be real-
ized at a sale."
"lit re Mayer, 157 Fed. 836 (C. C. A. 2d, 1907) ; It; re Mertens, 144 Fed. 818 (C. C.
A. 2d, 19o6) at 823: ". . section 57 (h) prescribes several modes of valuation, and the one
referred to is exclusive of the others and is superfluous and useless, unless it is intended
to authorize the creditor, without interference by the trustee or the court, to value his secu-
rity, provided he turns it into money 'according to the terms of the agreement pursuant
to which' it was delivered to him." Cf. In re Browne, 304 Fed. 762 (E. D. Pa. igoo).
' § 57 (h), Bankruptcy Act, 1898, 30 STAT. 560, § 93 (h), II U. S. C. 216 and 278, giv-
ing lienholder the right to value his security in one manner, inter alia, by converting it into
money under the terms of his contract.
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a construction unduly stresses the effect of § 57 (h), which appears to set forth
several modes for evaluating pledged securities and nothing more, yet that sec-
tion of the Act assuredly does not give the bankruptcy court any increased powers
of intervention."- On the whole, then, the blind adoption by the court of injunc-
tory process against the pledgee upon authority of the mortgage foreclosure hold-
ing, is at least a bit dubious and questionable. Especially is this so when it is
considered that in comparison with the mortgagee, a pledgee has a greater degree
of unhampered custody and possession over the pledged property, so that the
bankruptcy court must have a smaller degree of control over that property, dis-
tinguishing title from possession, and consequently a lesser right to restrain the
pledgee.
The contention that the bankruptcy court may not interfere with either the
mortgagee or the pledgee after bankruptcy because by so doing the obligation of
contracts would be impaired, has long since been discarded as untenable. 2
The ultimate problem of determining whether a bankruptcy court shall enjoin
a proceeding in another court or out of court, is one involving a delicate bal-
ancing of interests, i. e., that of an unobstructed, unimpeded and orderly juris-
diction exercised by the bankruptcy court on the one hand, weighed against an
uncontrolled pursuit of enforcement of liens by the lienholder on the other.
Under the present state of the law, both the mortgagee and pledgee are subject
to an equal restraint, within the discretion of the bankruptcy court. As to the
former, in a normal foreclosure on land located in the same district where the
bankruptcy court presides, there should be no particular animadversion towards
the result, for the mortgage lienholder may appear in the bankruptcy court and
have his rights litigated fairly, since the property will be sold in its natural
market, bringing the same price whether the sale is made by the trustee or the
creditor himself. With reference to a foreclosure on land in another district than
that over which the bankruptcy court sits, i. e., the Isaacs v. Hobbs, etc., factual
situation, several arguments have been advanced in the path of staying proceed-
ings. 3 First, it is suggested that a burden is imposed upon the mortgagee in
making him travel to the bankruptcy district to protect his equities. But, may
the mortgagee not employ counsel at that place to represent him without going
there personally? More cogent is the contention that the property should be sold
where it is located, for that is its natural market. This can be met only by allud-
ing to the fact that other cofisiderations may counterbalance the slight excess in
price likely to be derived from a sale in the home market. Due to these alleged
,difficulties, it has been urged that Congress should pass a law enabling foreclosure,
as a matter of right, notwithstanding bankruptcy, in the State or district where
the mortgaged property is situated.5 4
Turning to the pledgee, as distinct from the mortgagee, he may be virtually
concerned over the prospect of a delay encountered by virtue of the bankruptcy
court's injunction. In most instances, pledgees are banks holding a fluctuating
security as collateral, to postpone the sale of which might prove ruinous. Of
'In re Browne, supra note 49, "Assuming that this clause intends to do something more
than provide for a method of determining the value of securities held by secured creditors,
• . . I cannot avoid the conclusion that the court is only permitted to intervene when the
agreement between bankrupt and creditor fails to provide a method by which the value
of the securities may be ascertained . ... "
'In re Hasie, 2o6 Fed. 789 (D. C. Tex. I913), at 792: "Under the present bankruptcy
law there is no principle more uniformly recognized and rigidly enforced by the courts than
that valid liens, untainted by fraud, shall not be disturbed by the institution of bankruptcy
proceedings. But this has reference entirely to the validity and obligation of the contract
and not to the remedies for enforcing the lienholder's rights. These can be changed without
impairing the obligation of the contract"; In re Jersey Island Packing Co., 138 Fed. 6z5
(C. C. A. 9th, zgos).
A'm . BANKa. REv. (May, 1931) 299.
"Supra note 53.
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course, if the block of pledged stock is a large one, or together with other stock
held by the trustee constitutes the controlling interest in a corporation, it may be
advantageous for the trustee in bankruptcy to judiciously dispose of it, gradually
in the one case to avoid an over-glutting of the market, and as a lot in the other
instance, to procure a higher sales price. Both of these factual situations, how-
ever, are rare and infrequent. In the long run, not only would the pledgee him-
self be benefited by an unrestricted power of sale, but debtors as a class would
be able to have the advantage of more lenient financing conditions.
Thus, the court faced with the pledgee case need not have deemed itself
irrevocably bound by the same practical considerations which manifest themselves
in the mortgage case. In the first place, the delay incident to a sale by the
trustee cannot seriously harm the mortgagee, as it can the pledgee, since realty
values, as compared to security values, are relatively stable and non-fluctuating.
Secondly, whereas the mortgagee might be influenced by ulterior motives, not
present to the trustee, to sacrifice the realty at a rather low figure, to the detriment
of the bankrupt's general creditors, the pledgee could not very well do that, in
view of the fixed market price brought by securities on the stock exchange.
1. E. H.
DEPOSITOR'S RIGHT OF SET-OFF AGAINST INSOLVENT BANK-A long
line of cases establish the general and well-nigh universal rule that a depositor
in an insolvent bank has the right to set off a deposit presently owing to him
against a matured debt owed by him to the bank I on the theory that it would be
unconscionable to compel a payment in full by the former and to receive in
return but a portion of the debt which the bank by reason of its insolvency will
be enabled to repay to him.2 Set-offs which would be available against the bank
are not defeated by a transfer to an assignee for benefit of creditors or to a
receiver, for, by operation of law the property and the rights of the insolvent
bank pass to them in precisely the same plight and subject to the same equities
as when the bank held them.' The ordinary situation mentioned above presents
few problems and the present discussion will consequently be confined to a
consideration and analysis of those situations in which some variant fact raises
a doubt as to the propriety of permitting the set-off.
IScott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499, 13 Sup. Ct. 148 (1892); Yardley v. Clothier, 5I
Fed. 5o6 (C. C. A. 3d, 1892); People v. California Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 168 Cal.
241, 141 Pac. 1181 (1914) ; Security Title and Trust Co. v. Schlender, 19o 11. 6og, 6o N. E.
854 (I90I); Thompson v. Union Trust Co., 130 Mich. 508, 9o N. V. 294 (19o2); Mer-
cantile Nat'l Bank v. MacFarlane, 71 Minn. 497, 74 N. W. 287 (1898) ; Jack v. Klepser,
196 Pa. 187, 46 At]. 479 (19oo) ; Jones v. Piening, 85 Wis. 264, 55 N. W. 413 (1893).
Conversely, when the depositor is insolvent, the bank is permitted a set-off. 2 MicHIK,
BANKS AND BANKING (1913) § 134 (Ic) et seq.; i MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING (6th ed.
1928) § 337 and cases cited therein.
I Green v. Farmer, 4 Burr. 2214, 222o (Eng. 1768) ; Green v. Darling, 5 Mason 2o,
208 (C. C. Ist, 1828) ; Carr v. Hamilton, 129 U. S. 252, 255, 9 Sup. Ct. 295 (1889) ; Cen-
tral Appalachian Co. v. Buchanan, 9o Fed. 454, 459 (C. C. A. 6th, 1898) ; M'Lean v. M'Lean,
i Conn. 397 (1815); Nashville Trust Co. v. Bank, 91 Tenn. 336, 343, 18 S. W. 822, 823
(1892); I PoimaoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1919) § 113; 3 STORY, EQUITY JuRIs-
PRUDENCE (14th ed. 1918) § 468.
For historical development of the doctrine of set-off generally and with reference to
insolvency, see WATERMAN, SET-OFF (1869) I0 et seq.; MONTAGU, SET-OFF (1828) 10 et
seq.; 3 Bi- CoMM. 305; I POTHIER, OBLIGATIONS (3d ed. 1853) 458; Lloyd, The Develop-
ment of Set-Off (I916), 64 U. OF PA. L. REV. 541.
3 Oeborne v. Byrne, 43 Conn. 155 (1875) ; State v. Brobston, 94 Ga. 95, 2, S. E. 146
(1893); Van Wagoner v. Paterson Gas Light Co., 23 N. J. L. 283, 291 (1852); Miller v.
Franklin Bank, I Paige 444 (N. Y. 1829) ; In the matter of Van Allen, 37 Barb. 225, :30
(N. Y. 1861); Re Assignment of Hamilton, 26 Ore. 579, 38 Pac. lO88 (1895); Jordan v.
Sharlock, 84 Pa. 366 (877) ; HIGH, RECEIVERS (4th ed. 191o) § 247.
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A. Unmnatured Claim Held by Bank Against the Depositor.
A frequent situation is one in which the depositor's obligation is payable
in futuro, and the insolvent bank's claim is due and payable in praesenti. The
depositor will quite naturally, since it is to his advantage, seek to offset against
the debt which he owes in futuro, the funds on deposit which the bank owes to
him presently. The American authorities almost without exception permit a
set-off in that situation.
4
Objections to this result have been raised. Thus it was argued that to
allow such a set-off would create a preference in favor of the debtor as against
other depositors.5  Again it has been asserted that the debt when it matures
will be due to the assignee or receiver and not to the bank, whereas the deposit
is a debt due from the bank and that an allowance of the set-off offends against
the rule requiring mutuality of parties.6
Lindsay v. Jackson7 established the principle which has been since con-
sistently followed. In that case Chancellor Walworth said 8 inter alia:
"But as the debt of the defendants is due, and if they paid it im-
mediately, according to their agreement, the complainants might, without
any injustice to the other party, waive the time of credit which was for
their own benefit, and pay the notes immediately with the money thus
received, the defendants have no cause to complain of such a mode of
compensation."
The substance of this statement, which has been termed the "waiver"
theory, seems to indicate that the depositor if he chooses may expedite payment
of a debt due from himself, for in so doing he is merely waiving the provision
in his favor which gives him some period of credit.9 He may pay his debt at
once or by way of set-off of the amount due him from the bank. Courts gen-
erally adopt this reasoning to justify the result reached in allowing the set-off.' 0
Another theory advanced upholds the decisions but attacks the reasoning
contained in them." It suggests that before insolvency the depositor had no
right to pay his obligation before it was due and that after insolvency no con-
tractual right to pay ahead of time springs into being. But, if there can be
found an agreement, express or implied, between the bank and the depositor
that the obligation of the depositor payable in the future was entered into on
'Scott v. Armstrong, mpra note i; Fisher v. Hanover National Bank, 64 Fed. 832
(C. C. A. 2d, 1894) ; Yardley v. Clothier, mspra note i; Steelman v. Atchley, 98 Ark. 294,
135 S. W. 9OZ (1g1); State Banking Com'r v. State Bank, 185 Mich. 24, I51 N. W. 6o2
(1915) ; Bradley v. Angel, 3 N. Y. 475 (i85o) ; Fera v. Wickham, 135 N. Y. 223, 31 N. .
1o28 (1892) ; Jack v. Klepser, 196 Pa. 187, 46 Atl. 479 (1900) ; I MORSE, op. cit. supra note
i, § 338.
'See Steelman v. Atchley, supra note 4; Johnson v. City of Aberdeen, 147 Wash. 482,
266 Pac. 707 (928).
No court gives weight to this argument. Even under the NATIONAL BANK ACT, 13
STAT. 1I5 §§ 5234, 5236, 5242 (1864), 12 U. S. C. §§ 192, I94, 9I (I926), which expressly
forbids the giving of preferences, the courts hold no preferences are given. Scott v. Arm-
strong; Yardley v. Clothier, both supra note i. In Armstrong v. Scott, 36 Fed. 63 (C. C.
S. D. Ohio i888), the court held a preference was granted. Overruled by Scott v. Arm-
strong after having been disapproved by Yardley v. Clothier.
I Colton v. Drovers' etc., go Md. 85, 45 Atl. 23 (1899) (contains a clear presentation
of the argument). See also Bank v. District, 141 La. 1009, 76 So. 179 (1917).
'2 Paige 581 (N. Y. 1831).
8 Ibid. at 58
9Clute v. Warner, 8 App. Div. 40, 4o N. Y. Supp. 392 (1896) ; Nashville Trust Co. v.
Bank, supra note 2; Jones v. Piening, supra note i; WATERMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 146.
"See cases supra note 4.
1 Clark, Set-Off In Cases of Immature Claims in Insolvency and Receivership (i92O),
34 HARv. L. Rav. 178.
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the faith and expectation that any obligation running from the bank to the
depositor shall be credited on the obligation owed by the depositor,'" there is
then no need to force a change or alteration in the contract between the parties
in granting the set-off. Language in some cases points to the need for some
agreement, express or implied, to serve as a basis for a set-off.'3
When an assignment for creditors has been made or a receiver appointed
following the insolvency of a bank, it has been said the assignee or receiver
takes the assets of the bank subject to the defenses and equities which would
have been available against the bank.' 4  Should a non-negotiable instrument be
transferred even before maturity after the insolvency of the bank, the transferee
would take subject to all attaching disabilities including set-off.' 5 If the instru-
ment is a negotiable one the holder is protected.1 Some courts hold that taking
from an insolvent bank or its representative should put the taker on notice and
therefore subject the holder to set-off.' Granting that notice is thereby given,
there is a division of opinion 18 in this country as to whether a set-off is such
an equity as to attach to a negotiable instrument. If the equity of set-off is not
recognized as a defense to negotiable instruments even when in the hands of
one who is not a bona fide holder, then whether or not the insolvency of the
bank gives notice should be immaterial.'9
There are several decisions involving the question of the right to set off
deposits against rents accruing subsequent to the insolvency of the lessor bank.
In Partch v. Boyle o the set-off was permitted on the grounds that installments
of rent to accrue in the future constitute a "present existing debt" and that only
time is wanting to render them due. Several cases refuse to permit the set-off
on the grounds that rents accruing subsequent to the appointment of the receiver
do not constitute a fixed liability but are contingent upon unforeseen events."
A depositor cannot employ his deposit as a set-off for rent accruing under a
lease entered into with the receiver for the bank, for clearly this indebtedness
did not exist when the bank became insolvent.
22
B. Unmatured Claim of Depositor Against Insolvent Bank.
When the depositor's debt owing to the bank is payable in praesenti and
the insolvent bank owes the depositor in futuro the cases are in conflict as to
whether the right of set-off exists. Those jurisdictions which follow the
'-Ibid. at 187 et seq. This article contains a fully developed discussion of this thesis.
'Armstrong v. Scott, supra note I at 508; Sargent v. Southgate, 22 Mass. 312, 317
(1828) ; In the matter of Van Allen, supra note 2.
"See cases supra note 3.
11 Bank of Woodward v. Robertson, III Okla. 58, 238 Pac. 844 (1925) ; CoNTRACS RE-
STATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1929) § 167.
1See Armstrong v. Warner, 49 Ohio St. 376, 31 N. E. 877 (1892).
Wardv. Oklahoma State Bank, 51 Okla. I93, 151 Pac. 852 (915) ; Clark, supra note
ii, at 187.
282 DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (6th ed. 1913) § 1437, 3620 and n. 6o; NORTON,
BIL.S AND Noms (4th ed. 1914) 272.
1It is to be noted that in Lindsay v. Jackson, supra note 7, the court issued an order
to restrain the defendants from disposing of the notes. The justification for this action
seems to rest on the fact that without such a restraint the notes might get into the hands
of purchasers for value and so deprive the makers of their defense of set-off. It would
seem that the court did not view set-off as an attaching equity.
30 197 Iowa 1314, 197 N. W. 35 (1924). Hughitt v. Hayes, 136 N. Y. 363, 32 N. E.
706 (1892) involved the same problem as that of an unmatured note but arose under un-
usual circumstances. A purchaser of land from a bank successfully set off a deposit against
the purchase price, though technically the debt owed by the purchaser was not due when
the bank failed.
i Wasson v. White, 12 Fed. (2d) 8o9 (N. D. Okla. 1925) ; White v. Wasson, 118 Okla.
29, 246 Pac. 445 (925) (on the grounds that a preference would be gained).; Mandel v.
Koerner, go Misc. 9, 352 N. Y. Supp. 847 (1915).
Partch v. Russel, 199 Iowa 1049, 203 N. W. 8 (3925).
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Federal rule permit set-off under such circumstances. 3 As opposed to these
are the courts which have accepted the so-called New York rule of disallowing
the set-off in such situations. 4
One of the earliest cases of importance on this subject was Spaulding v.
Backus 2' in which the court in denying set-off of unmatured claims of an
insolvent says : 2
"The distinction pointed out in these two cases appears to be just and
reasonable. For, assuming that a court of equity may enforce a set-off
in favor of a plaintiff, to whom a debt is due, against an insolvent debtor,
who holds a claim not due, it by no means follows that it would be equitable
to protect a plaintiff from the payment of his debt according to his contract,
simply because the defendant, againsk whom he has a claim due at a future
day, is at the time insolvent.27 In the one case an insolvent debtor, refusing
to pay his own debt already due, would be simply restrained from holding
a claim, not due against the plaintiff, as an investment, or for the purpose
of paying or preferring creditors, and might be compelled to set it off, if
the plaintiff was ready to anticipate payment. In the other, the plaintiff
would be relieved from the performance of his contract presently due, and
be allowed to obtain payment of his own claim before it is due by the terms
of his contract."
A distinction is therefore drawn between cases in which the depositor sets
off his own liability, maturing after the bank's insolvency and those in which
the set-off is attempted to be based on a claim against the insolvent bank which
does not mature until after the insolvency. In the former it is conceded that
the depositor has a right to set-off, it being equitable for him to waive the pro-
vision in his own favor which gives him some period of credit; 2s but it is
insisted that to countenance a set-off in the latter situation is to force the bank
to pay in a manner contrary to the express provisions of the contract.2 9
Another ground on which the refusal is sometimes based is that,
.. . after the estate has passed to an assignee upon a trust to hold
for and to distribute among creditors, the former and natural equity (in
favor of the depositor) disappears in superior equities vesting in the gen-
eral body of creditors. They are then interested in having equality of
distribution, and if a creditor who, when the assignment was made, had no
"Ainsworth v. Bank of California, 1ig Cal. 470, 51 Pac. 952 (897); Brown v. Shel-
don State Bank, 139 Iowa 83, 117 N. W. 289 (19o8) ; Kentucky Co. v. Merchants' Nat'l
Bank, 90 Ky. 225, 13 S. W. 910 (i8go) ; Colton v. Drovers, etc., supra note 6; Hayden v.
Citizens' Nat'l Bank, i2o Md. 163, 87 Atl. 672 (913); Nashville Trust Co. v. Bank, supra
note 2; Schuler v. Israel, 120 U. S. 5o6, 7 Suo. Ct. 648 (1887) (in which a garnishee was
permitted to set off a debt owed by the attaching creditor to him, but not due at the time).
0' Taylor v. Weir, 63 Ill. App. 82 (1896) ; Hannon v. Williams, 34 N. J. Eq. 255 (i88) ;
Fera v. Wickham, supra note 4; Munger v. Albany Bank, 85 N. Y. 580 (1881); Davis v.
Industrial Mfg. Co., 114 N. C. 321, 19 S. E. 371 (1894); Chipman v. Ninth Nat. Bank, 120
Pa. 86, 13 Atl. 707 (I888).
"I2i Mass. 553 (1877).
" Ibid. at 577.
'Italics the writer's.
"Supra note 4.
""If it should so happen (which is doubtful and must be of very infrequent occurrence)
that the debt owing by the bank was not yet due, and the debt owing to the bank was by
a debtor who was himself insolvent, which would present a case where it might be to the
interest of the receiver to make the application, and to the interest of the other party not
to do so, I do not think the receiver could make the application, or insist upon it; for it
is not the province of the party whose debt is not due to insist upon having the benefit of
the payment before maturity, which would be equivalent to altering the contract of the par-
ties, and in effect allowing a party to commence a suit for the recovery of his demand before
it was due." In the matter of Van Allen, supra note 3. (Italics the writer's.)
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right to any set-off, may be allowed a set-off afterward, he gains a prefer-
ence." 30
Accepting these views, a depositor whose claim against the bank is due a
day before the bank is declared insolvent may set-off that claim and one whose
claim is payable a day after insolvency is declared cannot assert the right of
set-off.
The Federal view which allows a set-off in both situations, is grounded
on the principle that the insolvency of a debtor is such a circumstance as to
entitle the debtor equitably to a set-off whether or not the claim against the
insolvent is due, although it might not be strictly a legal set-off.31 The court
in the case of Nashville Trust Co. v. The Bank of Nashville 32 expresses it very
clearly in this way:
"In the absence of insolvency or some equivalent equity, it will not be
anywhere contended that a debt not due can be set off against a debt that
is due. . . . If both parties were solvent, so that both might ultimately
be collected, the law would afford adequate relief, and no injustice would
be wrought to either party. The one could not suffer by having to pay
his own debt according to his contract, if he could ultimately compel the
other to pay his debt according to his contract. But it is this very fact-
that if the one pays the debt due from him, he cannot compel payment of
the debt due to him, and will thereby suffer irreparable loss . . . that
creates his equity. Does it lie in the mouth of an insolvent to say that his
contract is violated ..... when it is apparent that he cannot himself
perform the contract?" 11
It has been suggested in answer to the criticism that the allowance of the
set-off compels payment by the debtor before the obligation is due that the
And more recently the New York Court of Appeals has said: ". . . in insolvency a
distinction exists between a debt due to the one who claims the set-off and a debt due from
him. If the debt is due to the one who claims the set-off and it has not matured, he is not
at liberty to off-set it against the debt which he owes." Gerseta Corp. v. Equitable Trust
Co., 241 N. Y. 418, i5o N. E. 5oi (1926).
But the theory that the time of payment is a stipulation for the benefit of the debtor
is not accepted in contract law. See 3 WIsrLSON, CoNTRmcrs (6th ed. I92O) § i8i8.
Mr. Justice Gray, speaking for an undivided court in Fera v. Wickham, supra note
4, at 23o. This case is a leading one on the view here considered. In it is contained a re-
view of previous decisions on the same question.
In Rothschild v. Mack, 42 Hun. 72 (N. Y. 1886), the set-off was permitted but on the
theory that because of fraud practiced on the plaintiffs, an action in assumpsit arose at once
in their favor for the recovery back of the money. Other courts suggest they would per-
mit set-off when special equities growing out of fraud or matters of trust intervene. Oat-
man v. Batavian Bank, 77 Wis. 501, 504, 46 N. W. 881, 882 (1890).
1Kentucky Co. v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, supra note 23; 3 STORY, op. cit. sUpra note
2, §§ 1871, 1875.
This right is not without analogy in other branches of the law. The right of stoppage
in transitu and the revival or creation of a vendor's lien in cases of sales on credit on the
insolvency of the vendee are examples. See WInLsToN, SALES (1909) §§ 522, 507.
-Supra note 2, at 349 and 351.
""Where both parties to a controversy are solvent, the right of set-off has merely
procedural importance. With or without the right, the ultimate condition of the parties
will be the same. But if one of them is insolvent, it is a substantial disadvantage to the
solvent party if he is compelled to discharge in full the debt which he owes and recover
only a fraction of the debt which is owing to him." 3 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 29,
§ 1998.
Those courts which refuse to allow the set-off deny that the fact of insolvency is a
sufficient cause for varying from the strict requisites for set-off, one of which is that the
debt be mature. Oatman v. Batavian Bank, supra note 30, at 5o3; Fera v. Wickham, supra
note 4, at 227.
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insolvency of the debtor (the bank in this case) who owes a debt not matured
should constitute an anticipatory breach available to the creditor (the depositor
here) for the purposes of set-off.34
It is inequitable, therefore, for the insolvent to break its contract to pay
in the future and at the same time demand that the other party comply with
his contract. By reason of insolvency the bank can no longer perform its con-
tract to pay in the future, and consequently the depositor is relieved of his
agreement to wait for payment which can never take place.
This suggestion by no means lacks support in the decided cases. It has
been quite generally held that the bankruptcy of one of the contracting parties
is, in itself, a sufficient breach of contract to support a claim against the estate
of the party who has been declared bankrupt.35  The Federal courts are con-
strained to permit the set-off in bankruptcy cases by an express provision in the
Bankruptcy Act.
36
The unmatured claim which the depositor holds and upon which the in-
solvent bank is obligated is usually a certificate of deposit issued by the bank.37
In those jurisdictions which recognize the doctrine that a debt which is not
due cannot be used as a set-off a failure to demand the deposit should defeat
the right since it is generally conceded that a deposit in a bank is not due until
a demand for payment has been made by the depositor.38  Notwithstanding the
general rule, when the bank becomes insolvent no demand is necessary to mature
the depositor's claim whether it be an ordinary deposit or in the form of a
'Clark, supra note ii, at 191.
'I re Frederick L. Grant Shoe Co., 13o Fed. 88I (C. C. A. 2d, 1904) ; Board of Com-
merce, etc. v. Security Trust Co., 225 Fed. 454 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915); Heywood v. Gold-
smith, 269 Fed. 946 (C. C. A. 3d, I92I) ; In re Bissinger Co., 5 F. (2d) io6 (N. D. Ohio,
1925). -
"Now, . . . upon a bankruptcy declared, all claims against the bankrupt become in-
stantly due (subject, of course, if not matured, to a rebate of interest), and are equally
entitled to dividends of the bankrupt assets." Mr. Justice Miller in Scammon v. Kimball,
92 U. S. 362 (875).
W3o STAT. 562, §63 (i88), II U. S. C. §103 (a) (I) (1926). "Debts of the bank-
rupt may be proved and allowed against his (bankrupts) estate which are (i) a fixed
liability, as evidenced by a judgment or an instrument in writing, absolutely owing at the
time of the filing of the petition against him, whether then payable or not .... " (Italics
the writer's.)
In Frank v. Mercantile National Bank, 182 N. Y. 264, 74 N. E. 841 (I9O5), the court
reiterated that in New York no set-off would be allowed, but that since the case arose under
the Bankruptcy Act, the courts of New York State were to be governed by the law of
set-off as it prevails in the Federal Courts. The set-off was thereupon allowed.
In 1914, an act was passed in New York which made the rule as it exists in the Fed-
eral Courts apply in the courts of that state. 2 N. Y. ANN. CONS. LAws (2d ed. 1917)
16o4 (§ 13). See Wolf v. National City Bank, 17o App. Div. 565, 156 N. Y. Supp. 575
(ii5) (a case which arose subsequent to this act).
In Taylor v. Weir, supra note 24, the court in construing a statute held that the only
right conferred by the act was to allow a creditor whose claim was not due to participate
in the dividends of the insolvent debtor's estate as any other creditor. The maturity of
the claim was hastened for one purpose only and that was to allow the claimant to have
a pro rata portion of the assets. To that extent only a set-off -was permitted.
I Staller v. Bank, 22 Mont. I9O, 56 Pac. iiI (1899) ; Salladin v. Mitchell, 42 Nebr. 859,
61 N. W. 127 (1894); Seymour v. Dunham, 24 Hun 93 (N. Y. i881) (all matured certifi-
cates of deposit). Taylor v. Weir; Munger v. Albany; Davis v. Industrial Mfg. Co., all
supra note 24 (all unmatured certificates of deposit).
The more frequent situation is the one in which the bank attempts to assert the right
to set off a deposit against an unmatured obligation owing by the insolvent depositor. The
same jurisdictional conflict exists. See i MoRsE, op. cit. supra note I, § 329, 2 MiCai,
op. cit. supra note I, § 134 (ica).
S 2 MICHIE, op. cit. supra note i, § 154 (3a) ; i MORSE, op. cit. supra note i, § 289.
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certificate of deposit.' Again, it is the "equitable considerations" of the situa-
tion which provokes the court to mitigate the rigor of the rule.
40
C. Mutuality of Claims as Respects the Parties.
It is often stated that in set-off the debts must be mutual and exist between
the same parties and in their own rights.41  It must be such a demand that the
defendant in his own name or in the names of the defendants sued, without
bringing in the name of a stranger to the suit, may maintain an action against
the party or parties suing.
42
In People v. German Bank," a trustee who deposited trust funds to the
credit of a trustee's account was not permitted even with the consent of his
associate trustees to apply upon his individual indebtedness the fund belonging
to the cestui que trust.
In several cases, however, the conclusion has been reached that one who
has deposited trust funds in his own name as trustee for a named beneficiary
may, upon the insolvency of the bank, set off such deposit against his individual
note to the bank." To support the result the courts have said that the words
used in connection with his name as depositor are merely descriptio pehsonae."
Chancellor Walworth in an early case 46 established the principle that an
indorser cannot offset his balance against instruments on which he is but sec-
ondarily liable and this doctrine has since been followed in a number of well-
reasoned decisions .4  This view is based upon the ground that to allow the
indorsers to set-off would extend to them an unwarranted preference.
But the current of opinion has in enunciating the general rule stated an
exception to it-namely, that if the person primarily bound upon the instru-
ment is insolvent the set-off is not to be denied to the indorser.4 1, Again we
must turn to the classic language of In re Middle District Bank " for the basis
of the exception:
".. . the effect of the insolvency of the bank . . . was to make all its deposit
accounts and all its certificates of deposit at once due without any demand or notice." Davis
v. Industrial Manufacturing Co., supra note 24, at 331. Colton v. Drover, etc., mpra note
6; Thompson v. Trust Co., supra note I; Seymour v. Dunham, supra note 37. First Na-
tional Bank v. Nye County, 38 Nev. 123, 145 Pac. 932 (914) ; 2 MICHIE, op. cit. supra
note I, § 154 (3a).
40 Hughitt v. Hayes, supra note 2o, at 167.
'1 Grew v. Burditt, 9 Pick. 265 (Mass., 1830) ; Fry v. Evans, 8 Wend. 530 (N. Y., 1832);
Scott v. Fritz, 5, Pa. 418 (I866) ; Nolting v. Nat. Bank, 99 Va. 54, 37 S. E. 8o4 (1901);
3 STORY, op. cit. mipra note 2, § 476; .WVATERMAN-, op. cit. sipra note 2, at 427.
'Jones v. Blair, .57 Ala. 4.57 (1876); Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. Poe, i47 Md. 5o2,
128 Atl. 465 (1925).
3 116 App. Div. 687, IO N. Y. Supp. 917 (19o6), affirmed without opinion in 192
N. Y. 533, 84 N. E. 1117 (1908). See People v. California Safe Deposit and Trust Co.,
supra note I.
It is generally accepted that a bank cannot utilize the funds deposited to a trustee ac-
count as a set-off against the indebtedness of the trustee. Walters Nat. Bank v. Bantock,
41 Okla. 153, 137 Pac. 717 (1913); Wagner v. Citizen's Bank, 122 Tenn. 164, 122 S. W.
245 (igog); Skipwith v. Hurt, 94 Tex. 322, 6o S. W. 423 (19Ol).
"*Funk & Son v. Young, 138 Ark. 38, 210 S. W. 143 (1919) ; Miller v. Franklin Bank,
supra note 3; Laubach v. Leibert, 87 Pa. 55 (1878) ; Comfort v. Patterson, 2 Lea 67o
(Tenn. 1879); 2 Micxnr, op. cit. supra note I, § 135 (ib).
'3Ibid.
In the matter of the Middle District Bank, I Paige .58.5 (N. Y., ,829).
7In re Garfunkel, 8 Fed. (2d) 79o (S. D. N. Y., 1924) ; Lippitt v. The Thames Loan
and Trust Co., 88 Conn. 185, 9o Atl. 369 (914); New Farmer's Bank's Trustee v. Young,
ioo Ky. 683, 39 S. W. 46 (1897) ; Bachrach v. Allen, 239 Mass. 272, 131 N. E. 857 (1921) ;
Stephens v. Schuchmann, 32 Mo. App. 333 (i888); Bank v. Mulqueen, 70 Misc. 137, 125
N. Y. Supp. 1034 (igio); Knaffle v. Knoxville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 181, 159 S. W. 838,
(913); Edmondson v. Thomasson, 112 Va. 326, 71 S. E. 536 (1911) (member of firm
indorsed firm's note and firm was solvent). See Bryant v. Williams, 6 F. (2d) 159 (E. D.
N. Car., 1926).
Is Ibid.
9 Supra note 46.
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"If the real debtor is unable to pay and the receiver is compelled to
resort to the indorser, who is eventually to be the loser, he has the same
equitable claim to offset bills which he had at the time the bank stopped
payment."
The basis of the distinction seems to rest on the :fact that if an indorser is
permitted to set-off while the one primarily bound is solvent, he is in a position
to realize full value from the bank first and then from the one whose obligation
he has paid,50 But if on the other hand the maker of the instrument is insolvent,
there being then the possibility of the indorser's failure to be fully indemnified
against the maker, the set-off is sanctioned.5'
The reasons for the exception in the event of the insolvency of the primary
obligor vanishes if the indorser has been indemnified. And with consistency,
the courts in the event of indemnification have refused the set-off.5 2
If a note is made for the accommodation of one who appears on the
instrument to be an indorser, he being in effect the primary obligor a set-off.
can be enforced by him regardless of the accommodation rhaker's solvency.13
The doctrine that the primary obligor must be shown to be insolvent as a
prerequisite to set-off by an indorser has been somewhat limited in several later
New York cases. 4 These cases reiterate the general rule but attempt to draw
a distinction between the situation in which the indorser affirmatively seeks the
set-off and one in which the receiver for the bank brings an action on the
instrument against the indorser. In the former the general rule that the one
primarily bound must be insolvent is held to be essential. In the latter case the
solvency of the primary obligor is said to be immaterial for the indorser is then
no longer contingently liable but absolutely bound on the instrument. 5
The requirements of mutuality of parties has particular pertinence in those
cases which involve partnership deposits and obligations. Ordinarily a joint
debt cannot be set off against a separate debt, or a separate debt against a joint
debt."0 It follows, therefore, that a partnership deposit cannot be used as a
New Farmer's Bank's Trustee v. Young, supra note 47.
Edmondson v. Thomasson, supra note 47.
Knaffie v. Banking and Trust Co., 13o Tenn. 336, 170 S. W. 476 (1914).
"But no such off-set should be allowed to an endorser where he is indemnified by the
real debtor . . ," Chancellor Walworth in In The Matter of the Middle District Bank,
supra note 46.
See Lippitt v. Thames Loan & Trust Co., supra note 47, at 2oo, 90 Ati. at 37.5.
Building and Engineering Co. v. The Northern Bank, 2o6 N. Y. 400, 99 N. E. 1o44
(i912). Also held that the right of set-off in such a case is not interfered with by § 192
of the NEaomrABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (as to persons primarily liable on an instrument
and secondarily liable) nor by § 29 (accommodation party is liable to a holder for value. etc.).
' "Curtis v. Davidson, 164 App. Div. .597. io N. Y. Supp. 305 (I94) ; Curtis v. David-
son, 215 N. Y. 395, io9 N. E. 481 (1915) ; Bank of United States v. Braverman, 251 N. Y.
Supp. 16o (ig3r) ; Bank of United States v. Bilgore, 25i N. Y. Supp. 163 (931).
In several early Pennsylvania cases the mere notice of non-payment to the indorser
fixed the liability and set-off was permitted: Arnold v. Niess, I Walk. 15 (Pa., I879);
Yardley v. Clothier, i Pa. Dist. 46 (1892).
'Justice Seabury in Curtis v. Davidson, ibid., speaking for the New York Court of
Appeals: "When an indorser is sued on his contract of indorsement he is absolutely liable.
It is not a defense for him to plead in such an action that the niaker is solvent. When
sued the maker stands, for the purpose of that action, in the same position as the maker.
In such an action against him he may set-off against his obligation as indorser any debt
which the holder of the note may owe to him. The allowance of such a set-off is not a
direct preference. The fact that the indorser may, if the maker is solvent be indemnified
by him, in addition to being allowed to set-off . . . does not preclude the indorser's right
of set-off."
"l Cohen v. Karp, 143 Md. 208, 122 Atl. 524 (923) ; Robbins v. McKnight, 5 N. J. Eq.
642 (1847) ; 3 STORY, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1874.
The exceptions for principals aid sureties are not within the scope of this discussion.
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set-off in an action against an individual partner for his individual debt." It is
to be observed, however, that an agreement by all the parties that a partnership
demand shall be set-off against a claim owed by a member of the firm as an
individual is valid."' In some instances it has been held that an agreement by
the members of the firm alone is sufficient. 5
In the converse situation-if an individual deposit is sought to be set-off
against an obligation of the firm-a similar result will be reached as that above.6"
But when the action against the partnership is brought both against the
firm and the members individually, a member of the firm who has an obligation
due to him may successfully assert a set-off."
Though in the matter of mutuality of parties equity is said to follow the
law, yet in special cases equity does permit a set-off not allowed at lawY2 Thus,
where the claimant against a partnership is insolvent, equity will allow a set-off
notwithstanding the lack of mutuality of parties.6 3
A surviving partner is considered to be the sole owner of partnership obli-
gations and claims. A debt due to a defendant as a surviving partner may
consequently be set off against a demand on him in his own right and no viola-
tion of mutuality of parties results therefrom.
6 4
In Funk & Son v. Young 65 the court very accurately said that "the trend
of all modem decisions is toward liberality in the allowance of set-off in the
case of insolvency of the party against whom the set-off is claimed to the end
that only the true balance may be required to be paid . . ." It may be added
that the right of set-off claims involving insolvent banks are very nicely balanced
upon principles of general equity in an effort that exact justice may be as
closely attained as possible. Though it may appear that the courts often are
driven to alter the contract to be enabled to allow the offset, yet this constitutes
but another notable illustration that in avoiding injustice, substance will be
regarded rather than form. S.L.S.
AESTHETIC REGULATION UNDER THE POLICE POWER-The common law has
has always shown a hesitancy, amounting almost to an aversion towards granting
legal protection to aesthetic interests. Whether this be due to a policy of expe-
diency, or to the rugged social conditions existing when this portion of the law
was becoming crystallized, or whether, as one writer has suggested,' there is a
Fralick v. Coeur D'Alene Bank and Trust Co., 35 Idaho 749, 208 Pac. 835 (1922) ;
In the Matter of Van Allen, supra note 13, at 230; Wreshall v. Cook, 7 Watts 464 (Pa.,
1838) ; 2 Micnrz, op. cit. supra note ,§ 135 (3c).
'Jones v. Blair, 57 Ala. 457 (1876) ; Hall v. Allen, So Mo. 286 (1883) ; Sewall v.
Roderwald, i Hall 348 (N. Y., 1828).
"' Jack v. Klepser, supra note I ; Edelman v. Scholl, 65 Pa. Super, 357 (ig6).
'Bailey v. Valley Nat. Bank, 2i Ill. App. 642 (i886) ; Bowling Green Savings Bank v.
Todd, 64 Barb. 146 (N. Y., 1872) ; Edmondson v. Thomasson, supra note 47.
'McAllister v. Millhiser, g6 Ga. 474, 23 S. E. 5o2 (895); Youmans v. Moore, ii
Ga. App. 66, 74 S. E. 710 (1912).
' Brewer v. Narcross, 17 N. J. Eq. 219 (1865) ; 2 MIcIE, op. cit. supra note i, § 135
(3c)& Spinney v. Hall, 49 Ind. App. 502, 97 N. E. 571 (1912) ; Fidelity Trust Co. v. Shan-
nahan, 14 Ky. L. Rep. II (1892); Eyrich v. Caital State Bank, 67 Miss. 60, 6 So. 615
(i889) ; Second Nat. Bank v. Hemingray, 34 Ohio St. 381 (1878).
" Skillen v. Jones, 44 Ind. 136 (873) ; Hewitt v. Hayes, 2o4 Mass. 586, go N. E. 985
(igio). See Miller v. Franklin Bank, supra note 3.
0 Supra note 44, at 44.
'Hamilton, The Civil Law and the Common Lazo (1922) 36 HARv. L. REv. i8o, 19i-2.
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racial and climatic basis for the aversion, it is at least evident that there is a
marked difference between the common law and the continental systems in this
respect.
2
As far back as 1587, Chief Justice Wray, in the case of Bland v. Moseley3
held:
"that for stopping as well of the wholesome air as of light, an action lies,
and damages shall be recovered for them, for both are necessary. . . . But
he said that for prospect which is a matter only of delight and not of neces-
sity, no action lies . . . and yet it is a great commendation of a house if it
has a long and large prospect. But the law does not give an action for things
of delight." 4
That this principle met with judicial approval is indicated by the large num-
ber of cases subsequently reaching a similar result either on the authority of
Bland v. Moseley or as a result of a similar line of reasoning.5 Nor is this view-
point merely a relic of antiquity. Three hundred and eighteen years after Bland
v. Moseley, a New Jersey court 8 made the same dichotomy
"Aesthetic considerations are a matter of luxury and indulgence, rather
than of necessity." 7
The increasing frequency with which the problem recurs in litigation prompts
a re-examination of the grounds and validity of this distinction. Taxes are being
levied for municipal "beautification"; property is taken by eminent domain to
preserve the "prospect" of a public park, and comprehensive zoning ordinances
are being supported by the courts as a proper exercise of the police power. In all
of these situations the aesthetic element is at least prominent.
The use of the term aesthetic, though, is doubtless misleading, and in reading
the cases an unusual degree of attention must be given to the factual situation in
each case where a court gives or refuses legal protection to an "aesthetic interest"
in order to determine in what sense the term is used. Aesthetic is apt to suggest
conflicting theories of art and hence a fertile field of controversy with no apparent
test of the validity or invalidity of the opposing arguments. This is apparently
the ideational background which leads a court to dispose of arguments for regu-
lation with the maxim "de gustibus non est disputanduwn". 'It must be conceded
that, granting the premise the conclusion, gauged by practical considerations of
expediency seems eminently correct. But though aesthetics be the philosophy of
2 "Robust good sense is the merit of our common law, but the fine taste, the aesthetic
sensibility which is the birthright of the Frenchman, as it was of the Greek is denied to the
Anglo-Saxon. 'Nature which gave them the gout only gave us the gout'." (1897) 13 L. Q.
REv. 337, 338. See Goodrich, Billboard Regulation and the Aesthetic Viewpoint with Ref erence
to California Hqhways. (1929) CAmF. L. Rnv. 120, 121. For the attitude in European
countries towards the problems discussed in this note, see WILuA-ms, LAW OF CIvY PLANNING
AND ZONING (I922).
'Reported in 9 Co. 57b. In Aldred's Case, 9 Co. 57b (16io) it was held that legal pro-
tection should be extended to the sense of smell. In an action for erecting a hog stye cor-
rupting the air, though the defendant contended that one ought not to have so delicate a nose
that he cannot bear the smell of hogs, it was nevertheless held that the action was maintain-
able.
, Italics the writer's.
'Aldred's Case, supra note 3; Knowles v. Richardson, I Mod. 5.5 (i67o).
' Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting Co., 72 N. J. L. 285, 287, 62 Atl. 267, 268 (I9O5).
'Italics the writer's.
8 See, Mayor and Council of Wilmington v. Turk, 14 Del. Ch. 392, 407, 129 Atl. 512,
518 (925).
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the beautiful, does it necessarily follow that the only test available in such a case
is a subjective one? 9
So far as the writer has been able to discover, little effort has been made to
establish the direct effect, if any, of beautiful or ugly surroundings upon the health
of the individual affected. 10 Such a study, when and if made, may establish such
a direct relation between the two as to provide a concrete objective test. Mean-
while, however, there is ample evidence as to indirect social effects."
Urban communities have come increasingly to be faced with the problem of
"blighted areas"--sections which have, in the course of a single decade or even
less, been transformed from beautiful residential areas into "slums". 2 In study-
ing this problem it has been recognized that man's sensibilities, whether for better
or worse, are inextricably interrelated.1" One's attitude towards neighborhood"eyesores" affects and is affected by one's attitude towards the hygienic conditions
and the prevailing moral tone of the community. A leniency towards the appear-
ance of one's environment results either (I) in lessening pride and "toughening"
the sensibilities with the consequent tolerance of unhealthful or immoral sur-
roundings, or (2) in a general exodus of the more sensitive from the community,
which of course does not alter the problem as a new "slum" district is nevertheless
created thereby. To assume, as many cases do assume, that an unhealthful,
immoral, or unsafe condition is a "concrete" cause of blighted areas but that
there is something peculiarly abstract and intangible about aesthetic causes is to
ignore the obvious interrelation between the sensibilities. It is at this point that
any thorough-going distinction, in zoning cases between the protected interests
of health, safety and morals and the "unprotected" interest in the aesthetic breaks
down entirely. If it be contended that the former is direct whereas the latter is
indirect, the answer is that not only is the community protected against acts which
are directly harmful to health, safety or morals, but also against acts which create a
situation which renders it more likely that such injury will result.14 An aestheti-
cally created blight is fully as direct and tangible as this.
Before investigating in detail the possibility of aesthetic regulation under the
police power it is interesting to note that the law has come to extend a certain
degree of recognition to the aesthetic in other situations. It is uniformly held
that money raised by taxation may be expended for municipal beautification
projects and the doctrine of public purpose which is requisite to support the tax
is liberally construed to include such an aesthetic purpose.' It has likewise come
to be well recognized that the power of eminent domain may be exercised for an
aesthetic purpose.' 6 A municipality if by statute enabled to do so may regulate the
'The idea here adduced is entirely apart from the question of teleology in aesthetics. It
is merely meant to be suggested that aesthetics (regardless of any purpose or "end") may,
like ethics, have distinct and tangible social consequences.
" Compare: studies made as to the effect of noise upon the human organism, GOLDMARIC,
FATIGUE AND EFICIENCY (1912) 68 et seq. and authorities there cited.
I EDMAN, HUMAN TRAITS ANIx THEIR SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE (1920) ch. XIII; JAS-
TROW, CHARACTER AND TEMPERAMENT (1915) ch. II; Rils, How THE OrTER HALF LIVES
(189o); RPas, THE BATTLE WITH THE: SLUMS (1902) ; Ross, SOCIAL CONTROL (1901) ch.
XX; SImKHoviTcH, THE CITY WORKER'S WORLD (1917) ch. II; TOLmAN, SocIAL ENGI-
NEERING (909) 339ff.; WALD, THE HOUSE ON HENRY STREE' (1915).
' METZENBAUM, LAW OF ZONING (1930) 124 et seq. 132-3; WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 208.
"Supra note 4.
"See, for example, the fire zone ordinances, infra note 35; Brown, Police Power: Legis-
laion for Health and Personal Safety, (1929) 42 HARV. L. REV. 866.
" Attorney-General v. Burrill, 31 Mich. 24 (1875) ; State v. Cornell, 53 Neb. 556, 74
N. W. 59 (1897); Matter of Central Park, 5o N. Y. 493 (890); Wul.A s, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 382; Baker, Municipal Aesthetics and the Law, (1926) 2o Iii. L. REV. 546, 553.
"' Attorney-General v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476, 55 N. E. 77 (19o2) ; Bunyan v. Com'rs
of Palisades Interstate Park, 17o App. Div. 941, 153 N. Y. Supp. 622 (1915) ; I NIcHoLS,
NOTES
use of public property or the public streets with a view towards beautificationYr
Thus it may require the plans of buildings to be erected wholly or in part with pub-
lic funds to be approved by an art jury ;18 it may regulate or prohibit the erection
of signs projecting over the sidewalk; I' it may prevent the display of garish adver-
tisements on the sides of motor vehicles driven through the streets,20 and the same
principle would apparently extend to the similar regulation of subway stations
and subway trains.2 Though these authorities indicate a growing recognition of
the tangible value of the aesthetic they go no farther than to permit regulation of
public property, or the acquisition of private property with compensation. A more
difficult problem arises where it is sought to regulate the use of private property
under the police power.
The police power was defined by Blackstone 22 as the power which concerns:
"the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom, whereby the indi-
viduals like members of a well-governed family are bound to conform their
general behavior to rules of propriety, good neighborhood and good manners,
to be decent, industrious and inoffensive in their respective stations."
Or, as Mr. Justice Holmes has expressed it: 23
"It may be said that the police power extends to all the great public
needs. It may be put forth in aid if what is sanctioned by usage or held by
the prevailing morality or strong preponderant opinion to be greatly- and
immediately necessary to the public welfare."
These broad general statements must of course be narrowed (i. e. interpreted
in the light of the factual situation of the case at bar and with due recognition of
the prevailing usage or preponderant opinion of the period at which the case
arose). It must be remembered, however, that this power being "one of the most
essential powers of government and one of the least limitable" 24 any limitation
expressed in terms of the case at bar cannot be considered as limiting the inherent
scope of the police power itself.25 " To permit any such inherent limitation would
be to bind the government in a judicially imposed "straight-jacket", fixing the
status quo as the rule for all future time and leaving no possible means of change
save by constitutional amendment. This "static" view is opposed to both reason
and authority.
26
Yet, in cases involving aesthetics this well-established principle is apt to be
overlooked. Finding the police power to be defined by courts (with reference to
the specific cases hitherto decided) as applicable to protect the public "health,
EMINENT DOMAIN (2d ed. 1917) 162; Baker, op. cit. supra note 15, at 548; Larremore, Public
Aesthetics (i9o6) 2o HARv. L. REv. 38; Note (911) 34 L. R. A. (N. s.) 998. But cf. Shoe-
maker v. United States, 147 U. S. 282, 13 Sup. Ct. 361 (1893) and Woodstock v. Gallup, 28
vt. 587 (1856).
IWLIAms, op. cit. supra note 2, at 563; Note (1904) 17 HARv. L. RLV. 275.
"Ibid.; See PA. STAT. (West, 192o) §299o.
"Walnut and Quince Sts. Corp. v. Mills et aL., 3o3 Pa. 25, 154 Atl. 29 (I93I); Hickman,
Aesthetics and Police Power (1931) PA. BAR AssN. Q., No. IO.
I Fifth Avenue Coach Co. v. New York, 194 N. Y. 19, 86 N. E. 824 (igog) (Igos) 21
HARv. L. REV. 443; (I9Wo) 22 IARv. L. REV. 379.
"Ibid.; WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 2, 408-9; Proffett, Public Aesthetics and the Bill-
board (ig3i) 16 CORN'. L. Q. 15I.
224 BL. Commt!. 162.
'3Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, I1, 31 Sup. Ct. I88 (1911).
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394, 36 Sup.-Ct. 143 (915).
For an account of the development of the police power and the effect of the Fourteenth
Amendment, see: HAsTrNGs, DEVELOPMENT OF LAW AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE DECISIONS RE-
LATING TO THE POLICE POWER (1900) ; GUTKRnIE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1898) 77 et seq.
"I FREUND, POLICE PowER (1904) 3; RUssELL, POLICE PowER OF THE STATES (1900) 35.
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safety and morals", 27 or "general welfare," 28 or "prosperity",- many courts hold
that aesthetics does not fall within the scope of the police power-not because of
any conclusion as to the reasonableness, advisability or necessity of the legislation
(thiat question is not even discussed in the opinions), but apparently because they
think the terms "health", "safety" and "morals" are divisible things and together
comprise the whole possible scope of police regulation? .3 Much of the confusion
in the cases is traceable to this concept of the police power in terms of fixed
categories rather than as something flexible-adiustable to meet the needs of a
changing social structure. It was a clear view of the nature of the police power
which enabled Professor Freund to say (at a time when attempted aesthetic regu-
lation was far less common than it is today) :31
"It is generally assumed that the prohibition of unsightly advertisements
is entirely beyond the police power, and an unconstitutional interference with
the rights of property. Probably, however, this is not true. It is conceded
that the police power is adequate to restrain offensive noises and odors. A
similar protection to the eye it is conceived, would not establish a new prin-
ciple but carry a recognized principle to further applications."
Whenever, then, a court refuses to permit aesthetic regulation under the
police power it should not be because of any inherent limitation in the police
power itself, but because either (i) the prevailing social opinion has not yet
reached a point where the particular type of aesthetic regulation in question is
recognized as necessary or expedient, or (2) the particular legislation does not
meet the test of "reasonableness" required of all regulation under the police
power. 2 Conceding that aesthetic regulation is within the permissible scope of
the police power when and if the social conditions and economy renders such
regulation necessary and expedient, to what extent, if any, have the courts exer-
cised the power. That is not easy to determine. In examining the decisions one
must (i) take account of the "category" theory of the police power which has
led many courts to support aesthetic regulation in terms of health, safety or
morals, 2 and (2) remember that the factual situations have no such categories,
but that "health", "safety", "morals", and "aesthetics" are usually merely different
facets of the same general problem.
The various zoning measures throw interesting light on the whole question
because of the varying emphasis in the several acts upon each of these elements.
Beginning with the fire-zone ordinances (of very early origin) which are pre-
dominantly safety measures," we have advanced to comprehensive zoning or
districting intended to cover the broad causes of "blighted areas" as modern
social investigation has revealed them. In the case of fire-zone ordinances, 35
'State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189 (1859); BmRLY, POUCE PowER: STATE AND FEDERAL
(1907) 9; COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (7th ed. 1903) 829; McGHEE, DUE
PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THI FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1906) 301; TIEDEMAN, LIMITATION
OF POuCE POWER IN THE UNITED STATES (1886) 4.
Ibid.; Town of Lake View v. Cemetery Co., 70 Ill. 191 (873).
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Drainage Commissioners, 200 U. S. 561, 26 Sup. Ct. 341
(I9O6) ; TIEDEMAAN, ibid., at 2.
0 RUSSELL, op. cit. supra note 26, at 34.
21 FREUND, op. cit. supra note 26, at 166.
Regulation under the police power must be reasonable in order to be lawful. FREUND,
ibid. §§ 63, 158. GUTHRIE, op. cit. supra note 25, at 76. WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1910) § 726.
1 For a rather thorough resume of the decisions in each state, see METZENBAUM, op. cit.
supra note 12, ch. 8.
' See, for example, Act of Assembly of Massachusetts Bay Colony passed in 1692,
quoted in METZENBAUM, ibid., 12-13 (requiring buildings to be of stone or brick covered
with tile, unless special permission be obtained to build with timber).
'City of St. Louis v. Nash, 266 Mo. 523, 181 S. W. 1145 (1916) ; MErZENBAUM, op. Cit.
supra note 12, at 81.
NOTES
sanitary codes, 30 tenement house codes,37 the safety and health emphasis was so
patent as to render any refinement of analysis unnecessary. Height,38 area, 39 and
side-line building limitations 40 were also upheld on the same grounds although
the aesthetic element was also clearly involved. "Set-back" or front-line ordi-
nances caused more difficulty. Those courts which upheld them did so on a theory
of safety or health,4 1 whereas the theory for holding them invalid was that they
were solely or predominantly aesthetic. 42 Nowhere, however, was the interrela-
tion between these various factors clearly shown. To any layman it was apparent
that the motivating reason behind such legislation was aesthetic. The conclusions
reached by the courts were probably determined by the correct legal principle
(viz., is there a predominant social opinion as to the necessity and expediency of
such legislation) but having reached a conclusion as to this the courts upholding
the legislation felt impelled to express this result in strained terms of health and
safety.4 '3 Courts reaching the opposite result thought it sufficient to label the
measure "aesthetic" as though that was sufficient condemnation.
It remained for the comprehensive zoning ordinance to clearly show the
interrelation of the various elements-health, safety, morals, aesthetics, etc.,
inextricably joined as the subjects of a legislative program designed to meet the
whole problem of the "blighted area". In addition to the usual fire-zone regula-
tions, sanitary measures, and building-line restrictions, zoning or districting of
areas according to authorized uses was attempted.44 Certain areas were set aside
for residence purposes only. Others were marked for business or manufacturing.
In interpreting such an ordinance there ig manifestly a point beyond which the
"health-safety-morals" technique becomes implausible or even ludicrous. It is
difficult to find any very compelling reason, from the standpoint of health or
safety, why a grocery store, butcher shop, dressmaking establishment or beauty
parlor should be excluded from a residential area. Yet the cases (especially since
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company," almost universally permit such
"districting". 40  Apart from any predisposition against aesthetic regulation the
advantage of such "districting" is obvious. A grocery store, beauty parlor, etc.,
in a residential area rarely adds anything to the beauty of the surroundings. It
is usually, as Mr. Justice Southerland would say, "a pig in the parlor instead of
in the barnyard".4 7 As such it becomes a contributing factor to the blight of the
district in which it is located. Courts recognizing the desirability and necessity
of such regulation nevertheless cling tenaciously to the static view of the police
power and uphold such ordinances as promoting health, safety and morals. The
reasons given in support of this theory seem almost a reductio ad absurdum of the
technique employed. Business establishments are said to be "more apt to breed
M' ETZENBAUM, ibid. 85.
'Tenement House Dept. v. Moeschen, 179 N. Y. 325, 72 N. E. 231 (904).
'Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, 79 N. E. 745 (i9o7), aff'd in 214 U. S. 91, 29 Sup.
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v. Building Comm'rs, 257 Mass. 82, 153 N. E. 319 (1926).
" Randall, Validity of Set-back Lines for Street Widening (1929) 13 MARQUEaTE L.
REv. 3o3.
Need of air and sunlight; fire hazard.
Dept. of Commerce, Standard City Planning Enabling Act (1928).
4r272 U. S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114 (1926).
'OBAssMTr, op. cit. supral note 38, at 5; supra note 33; Note (924) 72 U. OF PA. L.
R-v. 42I.
" Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra note 45.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
rats, mice, roaches, flies, ants, etc." ;48 they are "noisy and disturbing at night" ;49
"they invite loiterers to congregate";50 "they furnish an excuse to criminals to
enter the neighborhood where, otherwise, strangers would be under the ban of
suspicion". 5  Two cases," however, uphold such ordinances on the obvious
aesthetic ground without resorting to the "health-safety-morals" technique. Re-
gardless of the technique used, it is fairly apparent that the courts will, in effect
if not in words, uphold an attempt to combat aesthetic causes of "blighted areas"
as well as the health and safety causes of the same blight, as long as a reasonable
causal connection can be shown.
On the basis of the foregoing analysis it would seem, also, that billboards
and signs, at least equally with non-conforming business uses, would be a proper
subject for aesthetic regulation." Indeed the argument for regulation is even
stronger 54 here since the argument from the social utility of the use is weaker
and the boards are erected for the express purpose of conveying the offensive
aesthetic image, their value being measurable by the extent to which this dele-
terious function is performed. Here again, however, the causal connection be-
tween billboard situation which is the object of the legislation and the deleterious
social or psychological effect must be clear, and the rule of reasonableness would
apply here as elsewhere. The cases, though approximating this result, are in con-
siderable confusion as to the method of attaining it. Many cases hold prohibitory
or regulatory legislation invalid as solely aesthetic. 55 Only one case 5 6 goes so far
as to squarely uphold such regulation on aesthetic grounds. Most of the cases, as
in the zoning situation, support the ordinances on the ground of health, safety,
or morals, though here again the arguments advanced in support of the regulation
are often shadowy and insubstantial.57
Thus far the problem has been merely whether the state may regulate the use
of private property on aesthetic grounds where a definite deleterious social or
psychological effect can be shown to be produced by the use if unregulated. To
this extent, as has been shown, the majority of courts would be willing to go.
But may aesthetic regulation, at the present time, be carried beyond this? Some
quite eminent legal writers contend that the law should permit regulation under
the police power solely on the ground of aesthetics and that the test to be applied
is what a reasonable man would consider objectionable 5s-the inference appar-
ently being that apart from social or psychological "standard" or "measuring
stick" referred to above there is a general power to regulate in accordance with
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the artistic feelings of a "reasonable man". Ware v. City of Wichitaf 9 State ex
rel. Carter v. Harper,"0 and Churchill v. Rafferty "' are sometimes cited as sup-
porting such a proposition. The first two cases named arose under comprehen-
sive zoning ordinances, and the Churchill case arose under a Philippine statute
regulating billboards. All three on their facts would fall within the analysis
already indicated-the social or "blighted area" test. Though there is broad
language in each opinion as to the proper scope of aesthetic regulation there is
nothing to indicate that any one of these courts would go so far as to uphold a
statute such as that of Saxony 62 which in effect gives an official commission power
to refuse a building permit where the architectural plans are thought inappro-
priate. Where there is no test other than the individual's artistic feelings, how-
ever, the view of the court in Mayor and Council of Wilnington v. Turk 03 seems
quite justified:
"An individual may not relish the thought that an unsightly building is
to be erected next to his dwelling, or that some use is to be made of the neigh-
boring property which, though objectionable to his individual taste, is other-
wise harmless and inoffensive. 4 If matters of taste are to be allowed to
govern to what standard shall uses be made to conform. Tastes vary and
are as diversified as are personalities." 65
It seems likely that the present reluctance of courts to expressly recognize
any form of aesthetic regulation is traceable to a failure to distinguish between
those cases where the offensive structure produces a tangible social result, and
those where the fact of offensiveness is itself dependent upon the particular
aesthetic doctrine held by the individual. Rather than become embroiled in the
latter difficulty, courts choose rather to deny the possibility of any sort of aesthetic
regulation, and uphold such regulations as they think permissible, as health or
safety measures.
Would it not be preferable to concede aesthetic regulation to be within the
inherent scope of the police power, but hold that under the present state of the
decisions, such regulation will be permitted where no definite test, social or
otherwise, is applicable.
'c Supra note 52.
GO Ibid.
'Supra note 56.
Gesetz- und Verardnungs-blatt, Igog, Nr. 25 (translated in WuwAMs, op. cit. mspra
note 2, at 404).
Supra note 8.
Italics the writer's.
Note that this statement is entirely consistent with the view here suggested, as the court
is specifically referring to the case where no definite test of offensiveness exists.
